Blog #5: Acculturation & Resistance. Xinjiang Identities in Flux. Justin Rudelson and William Jankowiak

This week’s reading is an article written by Justin Rudelson and William Jankowiak which is titled Acculturation & Resistance, Xinjiang Identities in Flux. This article serves as an examination of the fluctuating identities in Xinjiang through a closer look at the regions indigenous people. More specifically, it focuses on the three different ways in which the Uyghur minority group in particular responds to Chinese policies. The article demonstrates how China’s implementation of these policies have manipulated certain weaknesses found in the Uyghur identity and have thus caused the Uyghurs to respond in one of three ways: through acculturation, non-violent resistance, and violent resistance. However, it is important to note that these Chinese policies have been designed in such a way that the Uyghurs are meant to respond “in ways that divide and weaken the Uyghurs” ( Rudelson & Jankowiak 300) because “these identities are inherently weak and in constant flux” (299).

The next part of the article focuses on China’s policies which are basically used by officials to undermine Uyghur nationalism. The article identifies these policies as the “hard and soft policies” (301). Essentially, the soft policies work to win favour among the Uyghurs by giving them more freedom and independence in order to tempt them to acculturate into Chinese society and ultimately prevent Uyghur nationalism. On the other hand, the hard policies work to prevent Uyghur separatism and nationalism by taking away that freedom and instead “clamping down on elements believed to be fostering dissent, advocating independence, or carrying out terrorist strikes” (301). According to my interpretation of this article it seems that the problem with this contradictory approach is the following: by using the ‘soft’ method there is a possibility that the minority will become strengthened at the local level and instead of becoming integrated into the nation-state it will resist acculturation through nonviolent methods. In this case the ‘hard’ method must be implemented by default and undo everything the soft method was attempting to do. In any case, it is important to note that the actual purpose or goal of these Chinese policies in Xinjiang is “to acculturate the region’s minorities into the Chinese state and integrate the region into China’s economy” (301). This goal is reached through the interrelationship of these two policies which we are told is the following: “hard policies are used to crush the various forms of resistance that surface during the period that soft policies are emphasized” (302).

Here it is important to question where Chinas plans for the modernization of Xinjiang fits into this mission to acculturate its minorities into the state of China? We are told that “Han immigration is the constant means to achieve this goal” (302) and it is my opinion that because of this influx of Chinese settlers into the region the Uyghur identity is currently under threat. Moreover, it seems to me that the modernization or developmental program is simply another effort to incorporate the autonomous region of Xinjiang into China proper. As a result, I feel that it is important to question the possibility for the Uyghur minority group to lose its ethnic identity amidst this program of internal migration and economic development? In the article we are told that “Han in-migration to Xinjiang is one of the most serious challenges for the indigenous peoples of Xinjiang, as they are quickly becoming a minority nationality within their ‘own’ territory” (310). In my opinion, this can be seen as one of the many effects of modernity in this region as Uyghurs are being drowned out by the Han-Chinese in what they consider to be their own territory.  Perhaps we can say that in a sense these Uyghurs have become Hanisized through acculturation with the Chinese state. After all, the purpose of moving the Han population into Xinjiang is to help acculturate and integrate the Uyghurs into Chinese society. Moreover, we must question whether those Uyghurs who have successfully acculturated themselves into Chinese society can be blamed for selling out their own people or their own indigenous identity for a new and more modern Hanicized one? An example of this is found in the Hui group and the Urban Uyghurs who have acculturated rather quickly into Chinese society (312).  It seems to me that in a way these minority groups can be blamed for the gradual loss of their ethnic identity because according to the article the Uyghurs “are the most culturally impenetrable” (311). To me this means that those Uyghurs who do find themselves acculturating into Chinese society only do so because they choose to. Otherwise, they have the power to resist such forces and keep their indigenous identity as is represented by the rural Uyghurs who we are told “resist all sinicization” (312).

Near the end of this chapter the scope of the article completely changes when we are told that “the greatest immediate threat to Beijing’s control of Xinjiang is not Uyghur militancy or terrorism but the HIV/AIDS epidemic that is already spreading there like a whirlwind” (318). In my opinion, it was fairly unexpected to come across this section in the chapter because the whole article focuses mainly on preventing Uyghur nationalism, and threats of separatism and terrorist attacks. I understand that the article itself is really on acculturation and resistance in Xinjiang but it still seems odd to me that the authors of this article waited until the end of the chapter to explain to its readers that the real problem in Xinjiang is the spread of HIV/AIDS. However, it is mentioned once before this instance that the developmental program in Xinjiang may be uncovering an enormous disaster “as it inevitably strengthens the very vectors that will help HIV/AIDS to spread among Xinjiang’s Hans, and in a region that already faces an HIV/AIDS crisis of epidemic proportions among its Uyghurs (310).  More importantly, this suggests that as a result of Han migration into the region of Xinjiang, the risk of HIV being spread throughout China has and will continue to increase. Finally, it seems to me that if this is as big of a problem as the authors make it out to be especially with the influx of Han Chinese settlers, then why is it that this issue is not really addressed until the very end of the chapter where two short sections are devoted to this huge issue. After all, the authors themselves close the article by confirming that “the HIV.AIDS epidemic in Xinjiang could ultimately derail China’s acculturation and incorporation mission in Xinjiang” (319).

-DK

Blog #4: Response to Maris Boyd Gillette’s, Between Mecca and Beijing

Maris Boyd Gilette’s work entitled Between Mecca and Beijing, focuses on China’s Muslim Hui community in “the residential district known locally as “the Hui quarter” (Huiminfang), or, more simply, “the quarter” (fangshang) (Gilette 22). Through a detailed study of the daily life of the Hui residents of Xi’an, Gilette gives her readers a glimpse into the effects of a state sponsored developmental program on a Chinese Muslim community.

What I found most captivating about this article was the importance of ‘culture’ as a part of government propaganda, the identification of the Hui as a ‘backward race’ and as a result the states Institutionalization of Hui Inferiority. First, it is brought to our attention that the state uses the phrase “low cultural quality” in reference to the quarter. We are told that in this sense ‘culture’ refers to “a body of knowledge defined by the government” (45). Moreover, it is important to note that according to the state of China, to have a ‘low cultural quality’ implies that one lacks education and thus the intellectual capacity to be considered ‘cultured’. As a result “China’s success at modernization depended on the CCP’s correctly engineering the ‘cultural quality’ of the PRC’s citizens” (46) and in this case China’s Muslim Hui community in Xi’an had become part of this developmental program. However, it is interesting to observe the causes of this supposed ‘low cultural quality’ that the Hui are believed to be endowed with. Oddly enough we are told that most of China’s Muslim Hui residents “held the government responsible for their lack of culture” (46) because they felt that their educational needs were not being fulfilled. This sort of inadequate attention offered by the government to the quarter provided this minority group with poor educational facilities and a lack of educational opportunities. In connection with China’s definition of culture and the states neglect of the Hui quarter, it seems to me that it is no wonder that China’s Muslim Hui community is identified as being poorly cultured by China’s state officials.

Next, in connection with the Hui’s supposed “low cultural quality” Gilette demonstrates how “the state was ideologically committed to viewing the Hui as an evolutionary backward race” (53). Here I want to question whether this means that according to the state of China the Hui are ‘inherently’ low cultured and backward? Moreover, as a result of their so-called developmental backwardness the Hui people received special treatment from the state. In this way “officials institutionalized the Hui race’s inferiority by ensuring that Hui ‘nationality’ practices continued, even while the government castigated them as ‘feudal’, ‘backward,’ and ‘superstitious’” (53). This means that China’s non-Han races were classified as backward and less modern than the Han majority through the institutionalization of their minority ethnicity. This is most evident through the notion that “only China’s minorities had ‘national holidays’; the Han had none” (27). It seems to me that this sort of treatment makes the quarter even more identifiably Muslim in order for the state to be able to control its minority population. In my opinion this is all an effort to identify China’s minority groups by having religious holidays that are different from China’s majority Han population. This is evident through the idea that “’nationality’ in the phrase ‘nationality holiday’ meant ‘minority nationality’” (27). Thus, I want to suggest that the state of China gives its minorities a certain amount of religious freedom in order to be able to control them in the end.

Finally, China’s need to institutionalize Hui inferiority by China’s state officials is a product of the Hui’s apparent ‘low culture quality’ and ethnic ‘backwardness’. Thus, it becomes apparent in Gilette’s work that the state of China felt the need to intervene and modernize this minority group because “the assumption was that residents of the quarter were less capable of modernizing than the Han” (54). However, Gilette demonstrates through her work that the Hui attempt to challenge the role of the Chinese communist government by demonstrating that that they do in fact have the ability to develop and modernize without the help of the state. This is achieved through the use of consumption from which the Hui are thus able to position themselves within the state’s developmental program and thus become modernized. Moreover, it seems to me that the purpose of institutionalizing racial customs and habits by the state or as it is referred to in Gilette’s article as the Institutionalization of Hui Inferiority, is that the state officials are actually trying to prevent any forms of separatism by giving their minority groups this so-called ‘special treatment’. More specifically, it seems to me that in this way the state of China uses the Hui’s own ethnic identity against themselves by allowing this minority group to openly identify with their nationality while living amongst the Han majority. As a result it becomes evident in Gilette’s article that the state of China is able to institutionalize Hui inferiority in Xi’ans Muslim district.

-DK

Blog #3: Three Readings on Integration

The readings for this week seemed to all revolve around the notion of integration. The general theme seems to be the fusion of two cultures and the effect that this has on each culture itself. More specifically, the integration of Chinese and Muslim culture seems to be the main idea of the assigned readings for today. This is most evident in Luo Xiaowei’s work entitled The Mosque, because he demonstrates how the actual building of Islamic mosques in China can be used as a method for fusing the two cultures together. This is done by integrating the actual architecture of a mosque with Chinese culture or tradition in an attempt to produce “results which would be respected by Muslims and non-Muslims alike” (Xiaowei 211).  It seems to me that some very important issues are raised here involving the importance of one’s ethnic identity. In this case because of the creation of these Chinese inspired mosques it seems to me that this helped in the integration, assimilation, and acculturation of Islamic people in China. However it is important to ask ourselves whether the integration of one’s house of worship with another culture can be seen as a way of compromising ones religious identity or simply a method of acculturation. Although I do not necessarily have any problems with fusing aspects of a two different cultures together when they inhabit the same land, it seems to me that things may get complicated however when integrating religious spaces. Here it is important to question what the purpose of identifying oneself as a distinct religious ethnicity is if one is willing to integrate their house of worship with aspects of another culture? On the other hand, I also understand that perhaps we should look at these mosques as simply a physical manifestation of history and accept that they embody a unity created through such methods of acculturation.

Next, Anthony Garnaut’s article on Islamic Caligraphy in China seems to also demonstrate the integration of these two cultures through the form of art or calligraphy. In his work, Garnaut demonstrates how although Arabic writing with its “flowing tails” and Chinese characters with its “square form” are evidently different in form, there is still a way of integrating these two cultures. This is evident as we are told that “unique forms of Islamic calligraphy have emerged in China” (Garnaut 1). It seems to me that it is important to question the purpose of such forms of aesthetics in religious spaces because in the case of Islamic mosques in China this also seems to be a method of fusing two cultures together. For instance we are told that in a Chinese mosque there is normally “a pair of hadith or lines from the Quran in Sini script hedged into the form of the Chinese-character couplet” (Garnaut 4). To me this sort of aesthetic decision has a direct correlation with acculturation as a method of integrating two cultures.

Finally, Sachiko Murata’s article on Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light also has traces of cultural integration in it. Though I found this reading to be a lot more difficult to comprehend it seems to me that the main idea here is how Confucian ideas were integrated into Islamic thought through the book entitled Great Learning by Wang Tai-Yu. However, I am still somewhat uncertain of all the talk of “the real, the one” and bringing the many back to the one.

-DK

Blog #2: on Michael Dillon, China’s Muslim Hui Community (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1999).

In Michael Dillon’s work entitled Muslim Hui Community, we are told that “ethnicity is at least in part self-assigned. At times there are choices that individuals or communities can make as to their ethnic allegiance if not their ethnic identity” (Dillon 7).

To me this seems like an important issue to explore because it raises the idea of people having the choice to identify themselves with a certain religious tradition. However, it is my opinion that this freedom to choose one’s religious beliefs or culture instead of being born into them causes the validity of ethnicity to lessen. In Dillon’s work he speaks of the ‘inheritors’ of a tradition who according to him are “as much a part of the creation of that tradition as those from whom they inherited it” (7). This does seem to be true however, because of the existence of inheritors of religious traditions it is difficult to verify who is actually of that ethnicity. In my opinion, this seems like the problem they have in China now with its Muslim residents. How do we know who is actually part of the Han majority or the Hui minority? What if one is really a Hui but chose to become a Han, does this mean that they will be accepted as a Han by decent or inheritance? Here this raises the circular dilemma which Dillon also mentions in his work when he speaks of how the idea of sinicization is conceptually flawed because it is undoubtedly a circular dilemma. This is evident as “to be sinicized was to become like the Chinese who were only those who had been previously sinicized” (4). To me this means that there is really no way we can actually know for certain who was originally Chinese because of this circular dilemma. Thus, in my opinion there is no need to separate the ethnicities or even treat the Chinese Muslims any differently. At this point if being ethnically Chinse is based on bloodline then the concept of ethnicity is really all relative. Finally it is my opinion that with the case of Islam in China there really shouldn’t be a crisis when differentiating identities because in the end both the Chinese and the Chinese Muslims are both still Chinese citizens.

-DK

Blog #1: Lipman. N Jonathan. Familiar Strangers, A History of Muslims in Northwest China.

In his essay entitled Familiar Strangers, A History of Muslims in Northwest China, Lipman examines the objectification of the Muslim residents of China as the Other. More importantly, he identifies the stereotyping of Muslim people as violent as a direct result of narratives written by the Chinese. This is evident as we are told that there is an absence of Muslims in China’s history, “except when Muslims become violent” (Lipman xvii).

In my opinion, it is important to question the validity of these narratives which are otherwise known as historical writing. I do not think it is fair to stereotype the Muslim people of China as violent and innately impure because of these narratives which we are supposed to regard as the truth. Rather I believe that it is important to examine the textualization of history and the validity of these narratives which according to Lipman “depends to a great extent on what people choose to remember” (xxix).

Also, we are told that “so few Muslims wrote Chinese well enough to compose their own histories” (xxx). Evidently this contributes to their powerlessness and lack of defense for their own identity. In the case of the Sino-Muslims their illiteracy in the Chinese language was not beneficial to them because they were unable to counteract any of the narratives written about them. As a result, stereotypes of Muslims as violent people who “were by nature fierce, predatory, and hard to control” (xxx) began to emerge. In this way the Muslim people were controlled by the Chinese and identified as the Other. The significance of this for me is found in the importance of language and the powers with which it is associated. I don’t believe it is an understatement when I say that if one wants to control the people, one must first control the language.

This issue of Muslims as a minority in China can also be related to the issue of misogyny in the Christian religion for example, where women were identified as impure in result of ancient biblical texts which were taken at face value. Today we know that women are not innately impure and that it is absolutely ridiculous to blame all the evil in the world on gender. However, the ‘Othering’ of the Muslim residents is something that is still imperative in China. It helps distinguish what kinds of people are admitted and what kinds of people are segregated in an attempt to dehumanize those who are seen as different. Thus, in this sort of situation it is important to ask whether one should compromise their religion, culture, and identity as a whole for the sake of being accepted in a nation? More specifically, should the Muslim people of China accommodate their religious beliefs in order to become culturally Chinese and feel at home?

It is my opinion that even if the Muslim people begin to lose themselves on purpose for the sake of being accepted as Chinese, still this will not prevent them from being identified as a manifestation of the ‘Other’. This is because of the immense power that China has over minorities such as the Muslim people where it can choose to freely take authority over its own troublesome Islamic region. Thus, I want to suggest that perhaps we should think about the possibility of Lipman’s aim in Familiar Strangers where he examines a “history of becoming and then being Chinese while remaining Muslim” (xxxvi).

-DK